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**Taking back control: Comprador bankers and managerial developmentalism in Poland**

*Review of International Political Economy*

APPENDIX A.8.

The creation of the Polish Development Fund (PFR)

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# A.8.1 Summary of evidence on the creation of the PFR

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| **Actors** | ***“Guilty mind” hoop test***  **Have they *wanted* to create a new developmental finance institution? And from when?** | ***“Guilty act” hoop test***  **Have they *actively participated* in the creation of the PFR? And from when?** | **Who has mobilized whom to participate in the creation of the PFR?** |
| *Civic Platform (PO) leadership* | Except for declarations by Donald Tusk that he wants to create a “Polish EBRD” and a similar declaration by a PO-appointed Minister of the Treasury in 2014 (both in [A.8.2.9](#A829)), no evidence of any official party preference for an integration of developmental institutions.  *Inference: hypothesis fails to pass hoop test* | The PFR was created by the PiS government in 2016 and, given that PO never officially advocated for an integration of development institutions, it cannot be considered as having been in any way involved in the PFR’s creation (even by putting pressure on PiS to do so through party competition)  *Inference: hypothesis fails to pass hoop test* | *Not relevant given failure to pass hoop tests* |
| *Law and Justice (PiS) leadership* | The PFR is created by a PiS-led government and – except for some infighting between the Ministry of Development and the Ministry of Finance over the status of the BGK – it generates no controversy among PiS politicians.  Despite this support for the PFR and for broader support for a greater coordination of economic policy at government level in its manifesto, PiS did not propose to create an institution like the PFR Group before the concept is presented by Morawiecki in 2016 (e.g. 2014 manifesto: [A.8.2.7](#A827))  *Inference: hypothesis passes the hoop test* | The PFR is introduced by a PiS-led government. The first time the concept clearly appears in the public debate is when Mateusz Morawiecki presents it in February 2016.  *Inference: hypothesis passes hoop test* | Paweł Szałamacha, Minister of Finance in 2015-6 when Morawiecki announces the creation of the PFR Group, says that the concept did not emerge from the PiS party apparatus, but was developed by “Morawiecki and his people” (interview quoted in main body of the text)  *Inference: “Comprador” bankers (Morawiecki and his collaborators) co-opted Law and Justice into creating the PFR* |
| *Pre-existing development institutions (e.g. BGK; Ministries of the Economy and of the State Treasury)* | Before the PFR concept is presented in February 2016, the Ministry of the Treasury (under PO leadership) announces its intention – in 2014 – to create a “Polish EBRD” where PIR and BGK would be merged ([A.8.2.9](#A829)) though this is never implemented; this indicates an intention to integrate development institutions. The preferences of the BGK on that issue at the time are unclear. Before it becomes the Ministry of Development under Morawiecki’s leadership, the Ministry of the Economy does not make proposals to integrate pre-existing development institutions.  Once Morawiecki presents the PFR concept, the BGK clearly indicates its support ([A.8.2.15](#A8215)); Morawiecki’s Ministry of Development is supportive  *Inference: Min. of Treasury and BGK and (post-2015); Min. of Development pass the test; the (pre-2015) Ministry of the Economy fails the test or passes it with great difficulty* | Before Morawiecki presents the PFR concept in February 2016, only the Ministry of the Treasury clearly calls for an integration of PIR and BGK, but does not implement it, and, once PiS comes to power, the Treasury is inactive on the issue.  Once Morawiecki presents the PFR concept, it becomes clear that the BGK is actively negotiating with Morawiecki over the shape of the PFR ([A.8.2.15](#A8215)); Morawiecki’s Ministry of Development is obviously involved; the Ministry of the Treasury is a passive actor in those debates and gets dissolved in Q1-2017.  *Inference: The BGK and the Ministry of Development pass the test; the Min. of Treasury passes the test with greater difficulty; the Ministry of the Economy fails the test* | *Not relevant for pre-2015 Min. of Economy given failure to pass hoop tests*  The head of the BGK in 2013-2016, Dariusz Kacprzyk is a former Pekao top manager (2007-2009) from Bielecki’s times and BRE Bank manager (2009-2013) from Grendowicz’s (PIR) times; in addition, he is a member of the European Financial Congress’s Program Board in 2014 and 2015 (A.7.2.25 in Appendix A.7); he is therefore part of the “comprador” bankers group. But Kacprzyk is fired right after the creation of the PFR is announced (BGK, 2016).  Even if the Ministry of the Treasury made some announcements on a “Polish EBRD” in 2014, their impact is limited – particularly since the Treasury gets dissolved under PiS.  *Inference: “Comprador” bankers (Morawiecki and his collaborators) co-opted pre-existing development institutions* |
| *(Former) comprador bankers* | The European Financial Congress that gathers much of the financial community - and where (former) comprador bankers form the inner circle of the Program Board of the Congress (see Appendix A.7.2.22) - recommends greater “coordination” of state interventionism from 2013 ([A.8.2.5](#A825)) and the integration of existing development institutions – BGK, PIR *et al.* – from 2014 ([A.8.2.8](#A828); [A.8.2.11](#A8211)).  *Inference: Comprador bankers pass the test* | The European Financial Congress’s recommendations ([A.8.2.5](#A825); [A.8.2.8](#A828); [A.8.2.11](#A8211)) are public and are a form of lobbying.  The PFR Group is co-designed, publicly presented, and led by bankers (esp. Paweł Borys – PKO BP; ex-Deutsche B. – and Morawiecki – ex-BZ WBK – person close to the matter cited in the main body of the paper)  *Inference: Comprador bankers pass the test* | The Minister of Finance (2015-6) Paweł Szałamacha claims that the concept was developed by “Morawiecki and his people” (see main body of the paper). Morawiecki’s and Paweł Borys’s (PFR founding head’s) leading role is confirmed by a person very close to the matter cited anonymously in the main body of the paper.  The European Financial Congress also (informally) claims some ownership ([A.8.2.20](#A8220)) with hints by Mateusz Morawiecki that the EFC’s recommendations inspired the concept ([A.8.2.21](#A8221)), but a person close to the matter cited anonymously in the main body of the paper denies an active involvement of the EFC in designing the PFR.  *Inference: Comprador bankers play a leading (co-opting) role* |
| *Employers’ associations / business groups*  (BCC, KIG,  Konfederacja Lewiatan, Pracodawcy RP) | In the late 2000s and early 2010s, BCC and Lewiatan clearly support a greater integration of export-promotion institutions ([A.8.2.1](#A821); [A.8.2.3](#A823); [A.8.2.4](#A824))  KIG supports a greater emphasis on export promotion, but wants to be active in that area itself ([A.8.2.23](#A8223))  None of the employers’ associations ever calls explicitly for an integration of all existing development institutions *before* the PFR is announced.  Once the PFR concept starts being announced,  Lewiatan expresses skepticism about an integration of pre-existing developmental institutions into a “superagency” ([A.8.2.12](#A8212); [A.8.2.13](#A8213)); Both BCC and Pracodawcy RP support the concept ([A.8.2.16](#A8216); [A.8.2.17](#A8217))  *Inference:* *BCC and Pracodawcy RP jump through the hoop; KIG and Lewiatan fail this hoop test* | Except for calls to reform *export-promotion* institutions,  no evidence of activities (e.g. lobbying) for a reform of all development institutions *before* the PFR Group concept is announced  Once the PFR concept is announced, even BCC and Pracodawcy RP – that support the concept – complain about the lack of details regarding the project ([A.8.2.16](#A8216); [A.8.2.17](#A8217))  *Inference: hypothesis fails the test* | *Not relevant given failure to pass hoop tests* |
| *Trade unions*  (FZZ, NSZZ Solidarność, OPZZ) | No evidence of salient preference for reform of development institutions  The OPZZ has its first meeting with PFR’s head, Paweł Borys, in February 2018 – i.e. *two* years after the establishment of the PFR was announced (OPZZ, 2018)  *Inference: hypothesis fails the test;* | No evidence of any activities (e.g. lobbying) for reform of development institutions  *Inference: hypothesis fails to pass hoop test;* | *Not relevant given failure to pass hoop tests* |
| *International organizations and international financial institutions* | No evidence of a specific preference for the reform/integration of Polish development institutions  *Inference: hypothesis fails to pass hoop test;* | Although the PFR cooperates with development banks such as the EBRD (e.g. Reiserer, 2018) or the EIB (EIB 2020) *after* its creation, there is no evidence of any calls by IOs or IFIs to reform/integrate Polish development institutions *before* the PFR is created in 2016  The EBRD has signaled its willingness to cooperate with Polish authorities of the governance of PIR – the predecessor of PFR – EBRD, 2013, p. 21; see A.7.2.16 in Appendix A.7). It may be that calls by the Ministry of the Treasury in 2014 to create a “Polish EBRD” ([A.8.2.9](#A829)) are a result of that cooperation, but I have no evidence for that.  *Inference: only hypothesis that EBRD has been actively involved might pass the test with difficulty; other IOs or IFIs do not “jump through” this hoop* | *Not relevant given failure to pass hoop tests* |

# A.8.2. Specific pieces of evidence on the creation of the PFR

## A.8.2.1. – Lewiatan 2007/07

Piszczatowska, J. (2007, July 20). Małe i średnie firmy potrzebują wsparcia w handlu z zagranicą [SMEs need support in foreign trade]. *Parkiet*.

Everyone is delighted with growing Polish exports, but the situation is not so good - warns the Polish Confederation of Private Employers "Lewiatan". - It is true that the results of large and medium-sized enterprises show that the percentage of exporting companies is growing, as is the share of export revenues in total revenues. But the data on the share of exporters in the entire enterprise sector clearly show a regression - says Małgorzata Starczewska-Krzysztofoszek, Lewiatan expert.

(...)

Small and medium-sized companies are doing the worst. A significant problem for them is the risk resulting from the lack of information about foreign markets and contractors. The problem with the strong zloty goes to the background. The latest NBP data show that Polish companies have already got used to it. So what should be done to help domestic exporters? - It's simple - respond companies associated in "Lewiatan". – One should establish an institution whose tasks will include supporting Polish exports and Polish investors abroad - they add. (...)

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| Own analysis:  This short article shows the long-time support of Lewiatan – Poland’s largest employers’ association – for a reform of the institutions supporting foreign trade, but no more than that – i.e. it does not suggest that Lewiatan has a broader vision of a reform and integration of all development institutions. |

## A.8.2.2. – Lewiatan 2009/02

Gazeta Wyborcza (2009, February 13). Lewiatan chce wyłączenia BGK spod regulacji bankowych [Lewiatan wants BGK to be excluded from banking regulations] <https://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114873,6266283,lewiatan-chce-wylaczenia-bgk-spod-regulacji-bankowych.html>

The Confederation of Private Employers "Lewiatan" wants Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego [BGK] to be excluded from generally applicable banking regulations. According to Lewiatan, this would make it easier for companies to access loans.

The President of the Confederation, Henryka Bochniarz, emphasizes that it is also important for the lending activity that the government activates guarantees and sureties from BGK. Henryka Bochniarz adds that the help of this bank will then be a great help for companies applying for a loan.

(...)

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| Own analysis:  This short article shows that Lewiatan supported a growing role of the BGK during the crisis, but no more than that – i.e. it does not suggest that Lewiatan has a broader vision of a reform and integration of all development institutions. |

## A.8.2.3. – BCC 2010/10

Osiecki, A. (2010, October 4). Promocja polskiego eksporty wymaga nowej spójnej strategii [The promotion of Polish exports requires a new coherent strategy]. *Rzeczpospolita*. <https://www.rp.pl/artykul/544568-Promocja-polskiego-eksporty-wymaga-nowej-spojnej-strategii.html>

(…)

- Money to promote Polish exports is spent extremely ineffectively. As the Business Center Club, we counted several dozen institutions and units at ministries that have funds for the promotion of exports, but are subject to completely different decision-makers - points out Warski [BCC expert]. He mentions the examples of the Trade and Investment Promotion Departments subordinate to the Ministry of Economy, the Economic and Trade Departments under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Polish Tourist Organization, which is supervised by the Ministry of Sport. We cannot forget about the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency.

- Nobody is able to count the promotional budget of all these institutions - says the BCC expert

(…)

- These are large amounts that are unfortunately spent chaotically - says Warski, recalling the concept of one agency dealing with export promotion. Its creation would lower the costs of promotion thanks to the consolidation of the budgets of many institutions. However, according to Warski, there is no political will to create a single export promotion system.

- Poland is the only country in Europe that does not have such a system - the BCC expert is alerting. - Our efforts in several areas are badly organized - echoes Krzysztof Pietraszkiewicz, president of the Polish Bank Association, pointing to the need to build a financial infrastructure to support exports. - Banking subsidiaries in different countries must jointly support export projects - he adds.

Krzysztof Domarecki, president of Selena FM, disagrees with the thesis that the system does not exist. - The system is there, but not developed, because there are no funds, and there is no one to support. Poland's export potential is too weak, but we have commercial advisors, PAIiIZ, PARP - reminds the businessman.

(…)

According to Warski, in the case of Polish medium-sized companies, which usually have little capital, it is crucial to find an idea for financial support. It may come from state institutions, such as Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego or Korporacja Ubezpieczeń Kredytów Eksportowych.

- These institutions must, however, take over some of the risk related to exports - emphasizes the BCC expert. Pietraszkiewicz agrees. "The risk distribution between the exporter and KUKE has to be defined differently than now," he says. - The presence of business in the supervisory boards of such institutions as KUKE or BGK is necessary - he adds, encouraging dialogue between the administration and entrepreneurs.

(...)

- Business, politicians and administration must cooperate in promoting exports. This is our common interest, the participants of the debate unanimously emphasized.

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| Own analysis:  This short article shows that BCC supports an integration of export-promoting institutions, but no more than that – i.e. it does not suggest that BCC has a broader vision of a reform and integration of all development institutions. |

## A.8.2.4. – Hausner 2013/05

Hausner, J. (Ed.) (2013) *Konkurencyjna Polska – Jak awansować w swiatowej lidze gospodarczej* [Competitive Poland – How to climb higher in the world’s economic league]. Krakow: Fundacja GAP. <https://www.nist.gov.pl/files/zalacznik/1452360701_Raport_Konkurencyjna_Polska_Jak_awansowac_w_swiatowej_lidze_gospodarczej.pdf>

[N.B.: This is an excerpt of a report written by a team of economists under the direction of Jerzy Hausner; the first edition of this report was “inspired” by the President of the Polish Republic, Bronisław Komorowski, and funded by Orange Polska. The report was first presented at an annual conference organized by KIG (the Polish Chamber of Commerce). A second edition of the report was financed by Lewiatan. This is the only place in the report where existing development institutions are mentioned.]

2.6. Export promotion

(...)

The current export promotion system consists of: financial instruments of export support under the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and BGK; insurance provided by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation (KUKE S.A.) and promotional support instruments under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy and the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (PARP). The national information network on foreign markets is gradually developing in the form of regional Investor and Exporter Assistance Centers. The aforementioned entities must closely cooperate with trade and diplomatic representations abroad for such instruments to be effective. It would be advisable to establish a center to coordinate this cooperation.

The main objection to KUKE's activities is that too few Polish exporters use the insurance coverage it provides. Never in the over 20-year history of the Corporation has it been possible to permanently exceed a level of 5% of exports insured by it in all Polish supplies abroad. Although the main reason is the limited demand of exporters for insurance services (a large part of exports is made in intra-corporate trade, and a large percentage of small and medium-sized exporters do not carry out transactions in the form of deferred payments at all), one cannot forget about a small "appetite for risk" on the side of the Corporation. The authorities and supervisory bodies of the Corporation are trying to avoid the accusation that they exposed public capital to a serious loss. In this situation, it is desirable to strengthen the ability to operate and increase the effectiveness of KUKE.

(…)

It is important to coordinate and maintain high consistency of various promotional activities, which will bring noticeable results even with modest funds. It is necessary to agree and introduce a coherent narrative to the various communication activities carried out by public and private institutions and aimed at an international audience. From the point of view of the competitiveness of the economy, the essential values of the Polish brand should be innovation, creativity and efficiency. The proposed unification is an issue of particular urgency due to the significant resources allocated to various promotional projects financed from EU funds.

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| Own analysis:  This report by Hausner et al. cannot be considered as representative of official demands by business groups KIG and Lewiatan (see note above), but, given earlier statements by Lewiatan or BCC ([A.8.2.1](#A821) and [A.8.2.3.](#A823)), it is reasonable to assume that the report demonstrates the salience of a demand among Polish business groups to have a more coherent system of institutions supporting *export promotion*. However, the does not provide a broader vision of the reform and integration of all development institutions that would be akin to the PFR Group concept put forward in the Morawiecki Plan. |

## A.8.2.5. – EFC 2013/06

European Financial Congress (2013, June, 24-6) Recommendation nr 5 <https://www.efcongress.com/rekomendacje/rekomendacje-2013/>

**5. Priorities for sustainable infrastructure development**

1. NECESSITY OF A COORDINATION OF STATE INTERVENTIONISM

The state's commitment to infrastructure development - state interventionism - requires coordination. A clear vision of development policy is needed, as well as a concept for improving the supporting tools. Equally important is the ability to define development priorities in all areas, from energy to transport, and the means to be allocated to their implementation.

(...)

2. PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF THE PARTIES - A PRECONDITION OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE

It is necessary to implement the principle of the equality of parties in private law relations between the state and the entrepreneur, which will eliminate the dominance of public administration in contractual relations and thus ensure proper effectiveness of investment processes.

(...)

3. A NEW MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT BANK

As part of the implementation of the Polish Investments Program, the public mandates of the BGK and of the Polskie Inwestycje Rozwojowe SA (PIR) company should define their role as complementary to commercial institutions. These institutions should focus on offering instruments to facilitate the flow of financing and capital from commercial institutions to infrastructure projects.

*Justification and specification*

BGK and PIR should ultimately become a center of competence in the preparation of infrastructure projects from the financial side. Their financial involvement should encourage commercial entities to join the project.

In the field of financing infrastructure projects, BGK and PIR should be guided simultaneously by the following principles:

1. credit enhancement: lending and capital investment on terms that increase the attractiveness of the project from the point of view of banks and commercial investors (such as infrastructure funds) and offering guarantee products securing selected sector-specific risks and the type of project;
2. complementarity with the private sector: avoiding direct competition with commercial banks and infrastructural funds and performing a promotional role in relation to projects that are part of the BGK and PIR mission;
3. maximizing the multiplier effects: minimizing the involvement of BGK and PIR and maximizing the involvement of banks and commercial investors;
4. sound banking - a professional credit and investment process while tolerating smaller rates of return on capital employed than in the case of banks and commercial investors: the involvement of BGK and PIR should be a confirmation of the high quality of the project from the point of view of banks and commercial investors; however, the return realized by BGK and PIR may be lower, but it should be at market level all the time (using available instruments should not involve granting public aid);
5. precise external communication in the field of credit and investment policy as well as priority or reference project lists (in cooperation with the government).

Representatives of commercial banks and infrastructure funds present during the debate on the role of development banks in increasing the attractiveness of infrastructure projects confirmed that, in the Polish context, neither liquidity on the side of commercial banks nor availability of capital are a barrier. The view was also expressed that, along with the development of operations under the Polish Investments program on the above principles, there will be an increased interest in the presence on the Polish market by banks and infrastructure funds operating globally.

It was also noted that the activities of BGK and PIR on the above principles are particularly important in the light of changes in banking regulations, leading to a reduction in the periods for which financing is granted and an increase in its cost. Participants in the debate expressed interest in modeling the BGK business model on that of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

4. A VISION OF THE COUNTRY’S ENERGY POLICY

The commonly used concept of 'energy security of the country' needs to be clearly defined, taking into account the conditions resulting from the degree of self-sufficiency, production technology, the natural environment, business and political environment. Only a clear vision of the country's energy policy will enable the implementation of the investment program aimed at developing the Polish energy system. (…)

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| Own analysis:  This recommendation shows that, after having played a crucial role in setting the policy agenda that led to the creation of Polish Investments for Development (PIR), the European Financial Congress continues to mull the optimal shape of Poland’s developmental institutions over.  While still not entirely prefiguring its later 2014 and 2015 calls for creation of an umbrella group that would integrate pre-existing developmental institutions, this recommendation already calls for a greater “coordination of state interventionism” and discusses the relationship between PIR and BGK. It also mentions the EBRD as a model to follow (in that context, see 2014 proposal by Ministry of the Treasury to integrate the BGK and PIR into a Polish EBRD – [A.8.2.9](#A829)) |

## A.8.2.6. – BCC 2013/07

Denkiewicz, M. (2013, July 30). Bank uczy się firmy, firma uczy się banku [Banks learn to understand firms; firms learn to understand banks]. *Gazeta Prawna*

- The task of BCC is to support member companies in all aspects of running a business, also in the field of cooperation with financial institutions. We want it to be as good as possible, especially in the face of the difficult market situation, which is why today's meeting is so important - said Witold Michałek, Minister of Economic Law of the BCC shadow cabinet, opening the debate on "Capital for entrepreneurship 2014–2020. How to build a modern offer of financial services for entrepreneurs? ”. It was attended by representatives of entrepreneurs, experts from the financial environment, Ministry of Regional Development and BGK - institutions creating new directions for the development of modern financial instruments for business.

(...)

The conference was summed up by President Grażyna Majcher-Magdziak [head of a consultancy firm – BAA – that prepared a report for the debate]: - The basic question that we were looking for today was: how financial institutions and the state are able to support companies in change processes so that they successfully survive on the market. I have a feeling we've found the answer. Several elements are important:

- speed - small companies should pay attention to loan funds - here the decision-making processes can be accelerated; larger enterprises should take care of good, long-term relations with financial institutions, because then it is easier to obtain support in times of need.

- the type of assistance - there are many financial instruments, you need to know how to use them, and there is an important role for financial institutions and the state in providing effective information and education.

- company assessment - the problem to be solved is the development of a method of taking into account the company's survival ability by financial institutions. Also, the assistance of the Ministry of Regional Development should be structured in such a way as to also go to companies that do not meet the KNF criteria for various reasons. A memorandum will be prepared on this matter, to BGK, PARP, Ministry of Regional Development.

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| Own analysis:  This short article shows that there is a demand among BCC members and, more broadly, among firms for better information on the availability of financial support from development institutions, but it shows no more than that – i.e. it does not suggest that BCC has a broader vision of a reform and integration of all development institutions. |

## A.8.2.7. – PiS 2014/02

PiS (2014) *Zdrowie. Praca. Rodzina. Program 2014 Prawa i Sprawiedliwosci* [Health. Work. Family. The 2014 Program of Law and Justice] Warszawa: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość. <http://pis.org.pl/media/download/528ca7b35234fd7dba8c1e567fe729741baaaf33.pdf>

[N.B.: The 2014 Program – which was the party manifesto for the 2015 election – was presented at a party convention held in Warsaw on 15 February]

**Project for Poland**

I. Repairing the state

II. Economy and development

III. Family

IV. Society

V. Poland in Europe and the world

(...)

I. REPAIRING THE STATE

(...)

1. A WELL-ORGANIZED AND EFFICIENT GOVERNMENT

(...)

*Changes in the arrangement of ministries*

In order to ensure optimal conditions for the implementation of the substantive goals of the Law and Justice program, we will introduce changes in the allocation of government administration departments to individual ministers.

We attach great importance to the creation of a Ministry of Economy and Development, which will be responsible for the policy of accelerating the country's development with the use of budgetary resources and European funds. It will be headed by a deputy prime minister who, under the authority of the prime minister, will exercise power over the other ministers as regards the implementation of the development strategy. The deputy prime minister, who heads the ministry of economy and development, will also head the State Development Council, in which, next to outstanding experts, the heads of some ministries and the National Bank of Poland will sit. The primary role of the Council will be to coordinate the pro-development activities of these entities.

The role of the Ministry of Finance will be limited to strategic financial planning and keeping the state budget accounting. Public finances must be an instrument of economic and social development, not an end in itself. The dominant position of the finance minister in the government, which has been particularly visible in recent years, leads to excessive fiscalism, favors thinking according to the principle "no matter what," and restricts thinking and acting in terms of development.

(…)

II. ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT

As a result of the policy pursued in the past six years, Poland has found itself in the middle-income trap - a long-term slowdown in economic growth. It followed a period of relatively rapid growth, which should lead to the achievement of the average level of the most developed countries. The slowdown keeps it at considerable distance from the richest countries. It consists of - and is accompanied by - unfavorable phenomena: exhaustion of simple factors of economic growth, deteriorating demographic structure, low level of innovation, poorly functioning and overregulated economic administration, bureaucratization and low quality of economic law. All these factors are present in economic life in Poland. Other effects of the middle-income trap are the limitation of the growth of population incomes, inconsistency with social expectations, and the deepening of differences between regions in our country.

1. DEVELOPMENT POLICY

If we want to shorten the distance between Poland and the most developed countries of the European Union, our economy must develop at an average rate of 2-3 percent in the next 15-20 years - higher than the economies of these countries. Such a GDP growth rate can be achieved only with a very high share of investment in GDP, both public and private (with a positive impact on GDP of the other two factors, i.e. consumption and net exports), and provided that an appropriate level of economic efficiency and investment are guaranteed in knowledge-intensive sectors.

In the context of the global financial crisis, which has lasted since 2008, not only economic dogmas have changed, but also the way of thinking about the economy, which, unfortunately, has not been noticed by the current ruling camp in Poland. The world has won the conviction that the state has a duty to pursue an economic policy that will enable it to overcome the crisis. It is a concept of modern state interventionism, without which our state can only reduce the ailments resulting from the crisis, but it is not able to free Poland from the trap of middle development.

Contrary to stereotypical opinions, the activity of the state in the field of stimulating the economy does not mean neither building state factories, nor printing empty money or artificial stimulation of the economic situation through primitive and harmful actions, such as stimulating consumption, especially luxury consumption, by means of lending.

Donald Tusk's government continues to succumb to liberal illusions, as evidenced by, for example, the sale of national wealth. At the same time, which no longer has an ideological explanation, the economy and spheres of social life are treated as a resource whose acquisition allows the social base of power to enrich. The effects of such a policy are: historically unprecedented emigration of Poles, forced by the situation, demographic collapse and Poland's indebtedness at an unprecedented level. For these three reasons alone, Poland needs an economic policy that deserves its name, a break with the principle that "the best economic policy is the lack of such a policy". Law and Justice believes that the task of the state should be to create a development strategy and mobilize resources in order to overcome the middle income trap.

This goal can be achieved under the condition that it is recognized that the state is responsible for economic development and that it is the government's duty to develop and implement the concept of economic policy, and to make changes to state institutions that will enable the state to act for development. Only a development strategy can release the energy of Poles blocked by the Tusk system and enable the achievement of goals in the sphere of family policy, demographics, housing, work, education, health protection, science and innovation, etc.

The development policy of Law and Justice will be based on five foundations.

The first foundation will be the reform of the center, i.e. the reform of the government creating the conditions for efficient management of economic policy focused on development. We have described the design of the relevant changes in the chapter on repairing the state.

Secondly, guided by the Polish raison d'état, national interests and economic considerations related to development, we will keep our national currency - the Polish zloty. (...)

Third, we will reform public finances. (...)

Fourthly, we will reject the polarization-diffusion model of development in favor of the principle of sustainable development of the entire country. (...)

Fifthly, we will mobilize all available financial resources and other resources that dynamize the economy. The way out of the middle development trap requires the increase of such development resources and their accumulation. We divide the resources that we will run into two groups: simple resources and complex resources.

*Simple development resources*

The resources belonging to the first group are primarily of a financial nature. These are funds: from European funds; belonging to Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego; at the disposal of enterprises, including banks; contributed to Polskie Inwestycje Rozwojowe. (...)

In addition to EU funds, we will mobilize to the maximum extent possible own funds and savings of state-owned enterprises, and use the excess liquidity of banks. Another source will be the reorganization and savings program in budget expenditure. We will also use an off-budget investment mechanism involving the assets of State Treasury companies, including Polskie Inwestycje Rozwojowe and Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, as well as specialized investment support mechanisms, e.g. LTRO (Long Term Refinancing Operation - program of the European Central Bank) and pro-investment programs for Hungary.

Overcoming the financial and economic crisis that started in 2008 takes place with the great commitment of states - their national budgets, but also of central banks.

In the euro area, the European Central Bank launched the above-mentioned LTRO program for three years at the turn of 2011 and 2012, and then extended it for another two years (until 2015 inclusive); the program amounts to EUR 1.3 trillion, which is about 10% of the GDP of the euro area countries. Some countries outside the euro area, in agreement with their central banks, have launched similar programs to replenish liquidity in the banking sector and improve access to credit for entrepreneurs; such programs are implemented in the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Hungary and Croatia. The central bank lends directly to commercial banks, without interest, funds secured by loans granted by them to small and medium-sized enterprises. In Poland, a similar mechanism should be used. In the years 2015–2021, an amount of PLN 160-220 billion will be allocated for this purpose to loans for small and medium-sized enterprises that will be guaranteed by Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK). To this end, we will increase BGK's warranty capabilities. Such a move is in line with solutions adopted in other EU countries, such as Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. Strengthening the guarantee capabilities of the Polish BGK in the range of PLN 65 to 100 billion in 2015–2021 will be a safe solution, requiring no state expenditure and neutral for the budget.

We will increase the investment opportunities of the *Inwestycje Polskie* company, which will replace Polskie Inwestycje Rozwojowe (PIR) SA. In October 2012, the government announced the "Polish Investments" program, the purpose of which was to support investment processes in the economy with the use of public money from the sale of shares in State Treasury companies through PIR SA. However, the activities of this company to date have not brought the expected investment effects, so it will be transformed in such a way that it simplify its operating rules and improve the transparency of project selection procedures. First of all, the company's investment capacity will be increased by another PLN 25-40 billion in 2015–2021. The increase in investment funds intended for use by this company is justified by the pro-growth impact of large and very large investments on the economy. This company will be responsible for co-financing, or even financing, large investments in the field of technical, energy, road, rail and environmental infrastructure. Increasing the company's capital capacity will increase the interest of private investors in participation in large investment projects and will contribute to their efficiency, especially with regard to the construction of coal and gas power plants, gas pipelines, gas storage facilities, rail, road and port infrastructure.

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| Own analysis:  The PiS 2014 program shows clear support for a greater coordination of development through the creation of a Ministry of the Economy and Development to be headed by a deputy Prime Minister with expanded powers. The economic sections of the program also demonstrates an intent to reform development institutions such as the BGK and PIR (by transforming PIR into a new company called “Inwestycje Polskie”), but nowhere in the program is there talk of coordinating pre-existing development institutions under one umbrella institution. This certainly corroborates Paweł Szałamacha’s (Min. of Finance in 2015-6) claim that the “PFR Group” concept did not emerge from the PiS party apparatus or from allied think tanks such as the Sobieski Institute, but was developed by “Morawiecki and his people” in 2015 (Author interview quoted in the main body of the paper) |

## A.8.2.8. – EFC 2014/06

European Financial Congress (2014, June, 23-5) Recommendation nr 3 <https://www.efcongress.com/rekomendacje/rekomendacje-2014/>

**3. State intervention (involving public potential in development processes) - Coordination and analytical support**

1. While continuing the development of the Polish Investments program, one should adopt a broad concept of action and create a development institution with significant potential in relation to GDP, active in many markets, including the capital market.

2. The coordination of interventionism in Poland could use the many years of experience of the KfW Bankengruppe and, in terms of access to the so-called permitted public aid, the agreement of the German government with the European Commission.

This would mean, among others:

* establishing a state holding company, which would include, among others BGK and PIR. It would also be worth considering including ARP, KUKE and the newly created Capital Market Development Fund in this holding. The holding would be managed by an inter-ministerial body with the support of advisory bodies.
* separating in the holding a part conducting only market activity (on the model of KfWIPEX-Bank) and a part which would implement the so-called allowed public aid (on the model of KfW Promotional Bank) and would support, among others infrastructure investments, innovations and exports.
* developing a mechanism to support investments, guarantees and other activities in the area of ​​"non-market" projects, but with a high social rate of return. This mechanism could be clarified during negotiations with the European Commission.
* The "non-market" part should be exempt from income tax and not rely on KNF supervision.

3. When creating further structural solutions as part of the development of the Polish Investments program, it is necessary to ensure analytical, program and management skills resulting from coordination (inter-branch / inter-ministerial) functions.

4. The holding company's financial potential could be based on investment funds, which would ensure the required flexibility in multi-branch multi-industry activities.

Justification for the coordination of interventionism in the field of infrastructure investments

(...)

8. The assessment of the investments announced by PIR in terms of the "mission" nature and purpose of the "Polish Investments" Program is ambiguous. Not all of the announced projects seem to fit fully into the infrastructure support policy in Poland. The original PIR concept was unreasonably narrowed down to that of an infrastructure fund and fund of funds. It seems that a significant drawback is the need to obtain market rates of return for each investment, built into the PIR investment strategy.

9. Instead of making only market investments (yielding a market financial return), PIR should be able to invest in projects with expected social returns that private investors are not interested in. Mechanisms for supporting "non-market" investments will probably have to be approved by the European Commission. It is necessary to work out a way to introduce such mechanisms using the experience of other EU countries (such as KfW in Germany).

10. Apart from changing PIR's investment strategy, it seems reasonable to link PIR and the BGK through one owner and close coordination of the activities of both institutions. The merger of PIR with BGK would not be an appropriate solution as it could result in the entire activity being subject to restrictions resulting from banking law. Thanks to this change, BGK will be able to move away from the role of a Treasury bank towards a development institution supporting investments and exports. Various holding structures are required here, including BGK and PIR, as well as new organizational elements that should enable the creation of special purpose investment funds using State Treasury assets in order to create the expected added value. The Infrastructure Development Committee would enable inter-ministerial coordination through the participation of relevant ministers (treasury, infrastructure and development, economy, finance). The structure should also include an appropriate analytical and programming potential. Management quality and the competences and independence of the management team will be of particular importance.

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| Own analysis:  This recommendation shows that, as it has continued pondering the optimal shape of Poland’s developmental institutions, the European Financial Congress now suggests direct coordination of development institutions’ activities through a state holding structure modeled on Germany’s KfW Group. This recommendation closely resembles the concept of the “PFR Group”. I have not found it formulated so clearly anywhere else. In fact, I have conducted multiple searches both on Google and in Factiva using pairs of names of pre-existing developmental institutions (e.g. ARP and BGK; ARP and PIR, etc.) and have found no documents suggesting these institutions should be put under an umbrella organization except in documents of the European Financial Congress. |

## A.8.2.9. – Treasury 2014/08

Pytlos, C. (2014, August 28). Minister skarbu chce zbudować polski EBOiR [Treasury Minister wants to build Polish EBRD]. *Dziennik Gazeta Prawna*. <https://biznes.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/818212,minister-skarbu-chce-zbudowac-polski-eboir.html>

(…)

Minister of Treasury Włodzimierz Karpiński said yesterday in the Sejm that two state institutions are to create a Polish EBRD (...)

Agnieszka Jabłońska-Twaróg, the press spokesman of the Ministry of the Treasury, denies that it is about the liquidation of PIR. - PIR have their hands full of work. Only by the end of 2015, the company is to sign contracts for projects with a value of approximately PLN 10 billion, he says.

Although she does not provide details of the project to consolidate BGK and PIR, she reveals that the operation is to be completed by the end of 2015. She adds that representatives of the ministry are already working with the Ministry of Finance on this concept. Talks are necessary because the Ministry of Finance controls BGK, and PIR is subordinate to the Ministry of Treasury. An additional problem in this type of undertaking is Polish law, which prohibits directly linking a bank with another economic entity. Nobody wants to talk about the details, neither in the Ministry of Finance, nor in the Ministry of Treasury.

Karpiński in the Sejm only explained that the model solution for the new project would be the EBRD.

And that's also nothing new. Already in May, a similar initiative was announced by Donald Tusk at the inauguration of the Board of Governors of the EBRD in Warsaw. At that time, however, the prime minister only thought about the transformation of BGK. However, he did not mention a word about PIR.

Yet in May there was no loud talk about the PIR as was the case a few weeks later - after the disclosure of tapes from leaked conversations between the interior minister and the NBP president. Let us recall that Minister Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz [Minister of the Interior] in an interview with Marek Belka [President of the National Bank of Poland] stated that PIR are unnecessary [this is a very euphemistic way here of translating swearwords used by Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz].

(...) BGK and PIR did not comment on the declaration of the Minister of the Treasury.

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| Own analysis:  This article from August 2014 suggests that the Ministry of the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance started talking about a potential consolidation of PIR and the BGK sometime in 2014. The merger talks are certainly motivated by the poor performance of PIR which became public knowledge after conversations between the President of the National Bank and the Minister of the Interior were leaked where the Minister of the Interior directly criticized PIR. It is unclear where the discussions about creating a Polish EBRD emerged. However, it should be noted that the 2014 EFC’s recommendation nr 3 (from June 2014) referred to very similar plans to integrate the BGK and PIR ([A.8.2.8](#_A.8.2.8._–_EFC)). Given the EFC’s direct involvement in the creation of PIR (with Leszek Pawłowicz still appearing alongside Treasury, BGK and PIR officials in committee meetings of the Sejm in October 2013 – A.7.2.15 in Appendix A.7) and given that the head of the BGK (Dariusz Kacprzyk) and a Treasury official (Rafał Baniak) were members of the EFC’s 2014 Program Board (A.7.2.25 in Appendix A.7) it seems plausible that the Treasury’s August proposal was inspired by discussing taking place at the EFC (and – remember – the EFC can be seen as a instrument allowing comprador bankers to co-opt potential allies into the new developmental alliance they are building). Anyway, the Treasury’s 2014 proposal was never really implemented and is still quite far away from the idea of integrating most existing development institutions into a “PFR Group” |

## A.8.2.10. – BCC 2014/09

BCC (2014, September 29) Gospodarczy Gabinet Cieni BCC wyznaczył zadania dla nowego rządu [The shadow economic cabinet of BCC has set the tasks the new government should pursue] <http://www.bcc.org.pl/uploads/media/2014.09.29_X_posiedzenie_GGC_BCC-_OCENA_III_kwartalu_2014.pdf>

(…)

Actions that deserve approval:

1. The Minister of Treasury decided to hand over the company Polskie Inwestycje Rozwojowe under the ownership control of BGK and create the so-called Polish EBRD. It is a good decision; probably the most sensible since the establishment of the PIR. A company such as PIR must have a direct link with a financial institution that will be a donor of capital funds for investments supported by PIR. Moreover, releasing PIR from the direct supervision of the Minister of the Treasury will reduce the emphasis on involving PIR in projects carried out by state-owned companies. The purpose of this company is to support projects important to the economy, and not always implemented by state-owned entities. (…)

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| Own analysis:  This short reaction by BCC to the announcement by the Ministry of the Treasury of its intention to merge or integrate BGK and PIR with each other shows, at the very least, latent support for an integration of developmental institutions, but nothing beyond really: BCC does not articulate a clear vision of how the institutions should be merged and BCC does not talk about other existing development institutions (ARP, PARP, KUKE, etc.). |

## A.8.2.11. – EFC 2015/06

European Financial Congress (2015, June, 22-4) Recommendation nr 11 <https://www.efcongress.com/rekomendacje/rekomendacje-2015/>

**11. Active industrial policy, i.e. ending short-termism**

We recommend:

1. Starting to work on a strategy for the development of Polish industry, covering not only the segment of the largest enterprises, but also the segment of medium-sized enterprises, including family ones.

2. Beginning to work on creating a mechanism of coordination of the activities - and using synergies in implementing the industrial development policy - between the Ministry of the Treasury, the Ministry of the Economy, Industrial Development Agency (ARP) SA, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), Polskie Inwestycje Rozwojowe (PIR) SA and KUKE.

3. Starting to work on finding an optimal mechanism for developing a market for private equity firms, especially in the segment of growth funds with medium capitalization.

4. Active measures to reduce the phenomenon of short-termism in the Polish economy and on the domestic capital market, including: introduction of regulatory and tax solutions encouraging institutional investors to maintain assets in their portfolio in the long term, compliance with the principles of good practice in the assessment and remuneration of management strategic companies.

Substantiation

(...)

In the Polish economy, there are the following economic and administrative entities implementing the state's development policy also in the area of ​​industry: Ministry of the Treasury, Ministry of the Economy, Industrial Development Agency (ARP), Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, Polskie Inwestycje Rozwojowe (PIR) SA. In addition, NCBiR, KFK and PARP should be mentioned as institutions involved in financing venture projects (such activities also began to be carried out by the ARP), which sometimes may ultimately apply to industrial enterprises. KUKE can play an important role in the policy of re-industrialization through guarantees for exporters, especially in the "high risk" markets. Currently, however, **there is a lack of state strategy in relation to the entire industry sector. An appropriate document should be created and the mentioned institutions should be included in the implementation of its provisions.** At a strategic level, such a document would help to coordinate activities between these institutions. At the operational level, it would indicate numerous potential areas of synergy between them - both organizational and capital.

The above-mentioned institutions could also contribute to the development of the capital market in the segment resulting from financial needs related to the implementation of the industrialization strategy. Currently, attention should be paid primarily to the need to develop the over-the-counter market of private equity funds, especially in the segment of growth funds and industry-oriented funds. These funds have a particular role to play in financing the growth of medium-sized industrial enterprises for which the public market may not be a viable option until the future.

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| Own analysis:  The third paragraph of Henryka Bochniarz’s speech suggests that Lewiatan broadly favour a greater coordination of economic policy at government level and, in that sense, could be suspected of engaging in a bottom-up cooption of the state for the PFR group (integration of pre-existing development institutions) concept. However, the last paragraph (including its first sentence: “We are now hearing that there is an idea to set up a new agency. I am a bit worried about this.”) suggests that: 1) Lewiatan has not been actively involved at that stage (i.e. three weeks before the Morawiecki Plan has been announced) in shaping – not even consulted about – the Morawiecki Plan and the PFR concept; 2) Lewiatan signals its skepticism about the creation of an umbrella agency that would integrate all pre-existing developmental institutions [which is at the heart of the “PFR Group” concept that is announced three weeks later]. Given this, it is clear that Lewiatan does not really engage in a bottom-up co-option of the state (or even other parts of the business community) in order to create a PFR-Group-style institution.  N.B.: The first paragraph of Bochniarz’s speech (emphasis on “private” firms vs. domination of State Treasury firms) implicitly signals her continued opposition to the idea of turning State Treasury firms into national champions and, for example, for the repolonization of banks |

## A.8.2.12. – Konfederacja Lewiatan 2016/01

Konfederacja Lewiatan (2016, January 25) Konferencja "Jak zwiększyć inwestycje i ich efektywność? Polska 2015-2025" [How to increase investments and their effectiveness? Poland 2015-2025]. *YouTube*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eX2kShZpxxE>

[N.B.: this is a transcription of the welcoming speech given by the head of Konfederacja Lewiatan, Henryka Bochniarz, at a conference organized by Lewiatan and where Mateusz Morawiecki gave a keynote speech]

Henryka Bochniarz: Welcome everyone, particularly Mr. Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. (…) There is a great need for such a meeting and I hope that today we will learn a little more about the future of economic policy. I think that there is no reason to explain what we are doing either to the Prime Minister or to the members of Lewiatan since we have been trying to represent the interests of entrepreneurs in a very consistent manner for the past sixteen years. As you remember, at the very beginning, we also had the Confederation of *Private* Employers in our name because we wanted to think very consistently about this [private] sector, especially since other organizations were largely dominated by State Treasury companies. A few years ago, we decided that we can already say that we are the Lewiatan Confederation and that we represent *all* entrepreneurs. When I sometimes listen to expressions of love for the property of the State Treasury, I wonder if we will have to go back to the previous name. I hope that it will not be so, but that this interest of entrepreneurs will be realized so that companies can develop regardless of what banner they wear.

We also try to conduct our business very consistently because, during these 26 years of development of the Polish economy, we managed to gather quite a lot of knowledge among entrepreneurs, also here at Lewiatan since we probably have the largest group of experts among all economic organizations. This is already an achievement that allows us to formulate various types of proposals, which are no longer just slogans, but behind which there are very specific solutions, drawing on the experience of both other countries and what is happening in the European Union and looking for our best solutions. One of such undertakings is the series of conferences "Poland 2015-2025" because we believed that, regardless of what the ruling team will be, it would be good for us to be able to talk openly and very specifically about the development strategy. (...)

We were all pleased with the appointment of Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, not only because he is a person who functioned in business, but also because the competences that the Prime Minister has received largely respond to these expectations of economic circles. We have indeed been very consistent in criticizing this “silo” [uncoordinated] implementation [of economic policy] by our administration and the way economic structures have been functioning. I think that the role of the coordinator [the Ministry of Development is supposed to coordinate economic policy] here - someone who tries to look for common solutions above these interests of the Ministry - is extremely important. I hope that the Prime Minister [Morawiecki] will also manage to complete this task. (...)

In one of his speeches, the Prime Minister [Mateusz Morawiecki] said that increasing the share of investments and their effectiveness is what is absolutely most necessary at the moment and what may contribute the most to a faster development of the Polish economy than before - although we believe that even maintaining the current pace of growth is a very ambitious task. As part of our work, we have prepared our own white paper, which the Prime Minister has already received. (...) There are a dozen or so of proposals on what should be done to really increase the share of investment (...) I will mention a few things that are mentioned there. (...)

One thing that we believe is absolutely fundamental is the lawmaking system. (…) The second issue is the issue of public procurement. We are working hard on this matter with the Ministry of Economy (...). We have already talked about it with Prime Minister Morawiecki and have said that we believe that, at this stage, what needs to be done is to adopt solutions that will enable the implementation of the EU directive and then to seriously think about a new law on public procurement. Without this, it is impossible to increase the share of investments.

Another thing that will surely translate into investment opportunities is the issue of the promotion of exports. We have a long history of solutions in this area. In fact, there has been a constant and underground struggle between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Economy, and the many institutions that participate in this promotion. The result is that, even though there have been a lot of funds – and it is not just a matter of money, the diversity of institutions that has been functioning in this area undoubtedly limits their effectiveness, especially as there is often a duplication of work.

We are now hearing that there is an idea to set up a new agency. I am a bit worried about this. In 2006, i.e. under the previous PiS government, a bill was already ready. It even went through the first reading and wonder whether it might be worth just going back to what had been worked out back then. I hope that the Prime Minister [Morawiecki] will tell us about it; what we found out only from the media - because there is not any more specific information, really - gives the impression that some kind of large agency will be established; it will simply require a lot of time to establish it and even more time for it to start operating. But we want action immediately! So there is a question of how to achieve a compromise between managing to achieve greater coordination of these activities and, at the same time, not creating institutions that will then mostly deal with themselves.

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| Own analysis:  The third paragraph of Henryka Bochniarz’s speech suggests that Lewiatan broadly favour a greater coordination of economic policy at government level and, in that sense, could be suspected of engaging in a bottom-up cooption of the state for the PFR group (integration of pre-existing development institutions) concept. However, the last paragraph (including its first sentence: “We are now hearing that there is an idea to set up a new agency. I am a bit worried about this.”) suggests that: 1) Lewiatan has not been actively involved at that stage (i.e. three weeks before the Morawiecki Plan has been announced) in shaping – not even consulted about – the Morawiecki Plan and the PFR concept; 2) Lewiatan signals its skepticism about the creation of an umbrella agency that would integrate all pre-existing developmental institutions [which is at the heart of the “PFR Group” concept that is announced three weeks later]. Given this, it is clear that Lewiatan does not really engage in a bottom-up co-option of the state (or even other parts of the business community) in order to create a PFR-Group-style institution.  N.B.: The first paragraph of Bochniarz’s speech (emphasis on “private” firms vs. domination of State Treasury firms) implicitly signals her continued opposition to the idea of turning State Treasury firms into national champions and, for example, for the repolonization of banks |

## A.8.2.13. – Konfederacja Lewiatan 2016/02

Konfederacja Lewiatan (2016, February 16). Najbardziej ambitny program gospodarczy od lat [The most ambitious economic program in years]. <http://pkpplewiatan.pl/aktualnosci/2016/83/najbardziej_ambitny_program_gospodarczy_od_lat>

The "Morawiecki Plan" presented by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Development has a chance to become the most ambitious economic program in Poland since the beginning of the transformation, on a par with the groundbreaking law of Minister Wilczek and the "shock therapy" of Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. Its success or failure will be determined by the shape of specific solutions and administrative skills of the government, including, in particular, the quality of dialogue with economic circles in the country and abroad - believes the Lewiatan Confederation.

(…)

Many postulates of pro-innovation and pro-export activities deserve support. (…) One should approach the postulate of supporting specific sectors (or clusters) of the economy with caution. Foreign experience shows that this has a greater chance of success if one selects sectors or clusters that already cope in the domestic market and in exports on their own, i.e. one do not have to pick leaders, but support [pre-existing] leaders. Similarly, the postulate of integrating a number of state institutions supporting investments, exports and entrepreneurship under the common roof of the Polish Development Fund should be approached with caution. Is such an umbrella necessary, and can the coordinating functions not be simply performed by the Ministry of Development? What happened with postulates with a long history - the establishment of export support institutions similar to JETRO or Korean Kotra? The same is true of a professional state-owned export-import bank, which is absent in Poland.

- The success or failure of the Morawiecki Plan will be determined by the shape of specific solutions - institutional changes and provisions of laws and regulations, as well as the administrative skills of government agencies that are supposed to implement such a plan. We are waiting for the first government projects of detailed solutions - adds Jacek Adamski.

The Lewiatan Confederation wishes to contribute to the success of the Plan and to present its own studies and expert opinions in an appropriate manner, along with projects of detailed solutions for many of its elements. (…)

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| Own analysis:  This reaction shows that Konfederacja Lewiatan does not immediately buy into the PFR Group concept (and the integration of pre-existing developmental institutions under one umbrella). Even though Lewiatan has signaled its support for a greater coordination of economic policy at governmental level, this reaction clearly suggests that the PFR concept does not reflect Lewiatan’s preferences. The fact that Lewiatan talks about the need to ensure “the quality of dialogue with economic circles in the country” and that “We are waiting for the first government projects of detailed solutions” suggests that Lewiatan was not even consulted over the Morawiecki Plan and the PFR before these were announced in February 2016. |

## A.8.2.14. – Pracodawcy RP 2016/02

Tvn24 (2016, February 16). Eksperci o wizji Morawieckiego: najbardziej ambitny plan gospodarczy od czasów Balcerowicza [Experts about Morawiecki’s vision: The most ambitious economic plan since Balcerowicz times]. <https://tvn24.pl/biznes/z-kraju/eksperci-o-planie-morawieckiego-ra619819-4466315>

(...)

Experts from Employers of Poland [Pracodawcy RP] commented on the "Morawiecki plan" in a similar vein. - The plan rightly points to the institutional weakness of the state, manifested in a multitude of institutions and an unclear division of powers. This state of affairs favors a blurring of responsibility for individual activities - and hence - for their effects, they stated. - There is also the phenomenon of the so-called “ministerial Poland” [Polska resortowa], manifested in a lack of coordination and cooperation between ministries and their subordinate offices, they added. According to Pracodawcy RP, it will also be important to integrate the existing development institutions (including the Export Credit Insurance Corporation, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego or the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency) into one strong entity focused on export promotion.

(...)

- The plan of Deputy Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki can be fully assessed when we get to know more details about its implementation. Previous development plans, also named after their creators, have just failed in the details. That is why we are waiting for them impatiently - said Pracodawcy RP. (...)

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| Own analysis:  Reactions of Pracodawcy RP show support for a greater coordination of the activities of existing developmental institutions as proposed in the Morawiecki Plan. These reactions do not tell us whether Pracodawcy RP called for such coordination beforehand or not. However, the fact that the reaction calls for “more details” suggests that Pracodawcy RP have not been actively involved in shaping – or even consulted over the design of – the Morawiecki Plan and the PFR before they were announced. |

## A.8.2.15. – BGK 2016/02

PAP (2016, February 24). BGK będzie miał wiodącą rolę w powstaniu Polskiego Funduszu Rozwoju - Kacprzyk [BGK will have a leading role in the establishment of the Polish Development Fund – Kacprzyk]. Polska Agencja Prasowa (PAP). <https://www.polskieradio24.pl/42/273/Artykul/1586731,Polski-Fundusz-Rozwoju-jaka-rola-BGK>

I believe that BGK will play a leading role in the creation of the Polish Development Fund, said Dariusz Kacprzyk, president of the bank, to PAP. He emphasized that all tasks assigned to the Fund are already largely carried out by BGK today.

(…)

**Polish Development Fund: a set of entities or one institution?**

The president of BGK emphasized in an interview with PAP that the concept of establishing the Polish Development Fund is currently being "developed". "I believe that certain benefits resulting from the fact that BGK is directly subordinated to the State Treasury will determine that it will rather be a group of entities closely cooperating with each other, and not one formal, legal, institutional product" - he stressed.

"The Polish Development Fund is a very valuable initiative. I treat it as an expression of the will to combine the power of various institutions, an attempt to" extract "basic competences from them and ensure better coordination between them" - added Kacprzyk.

**Talks on the concept of the Fund are underway**

He admitted that BGK is "actively" involved in talks with the Ministry of Development and other ministries regarding the Fund. "At the moment, work is underway to specify this concept. The Minister of Development is consulting this with us. BGK presents its proposals and comments," he said.

The head of BGK assessed that "all tasks assigned to the Polish Development Fund are already largely carried out by BGK today". He gave the example of cooperation between BGK and the Industrial Development Agency (ARP) and the National Center for Research and Development (NCBiR) in the field of innovation. "Of course, we can talk about carrying out more tasks and faster, but this requires better coordination also with non-financial institutions. I believe that BGK will play a leading role in this initiative," he stressed.

In his opinion, "the establishment of a new bank or a fundamental change in the scope of BGK's operations would entail serious threats from, for example, the European Commission in terms of maintaining competitiveness". "It is a matter of a long process of obtaining a license, obtaining various permits. BGK is indicated in many regulations as an institution that enjoys, for example, some privileges when it comes to regulations, prudential standards. This is certainly the reason why one should retain it as a financial institution "- he assessed.

"Also, the insurance activity that KUKE conducts cannot be combined with banking activity. Therefore, there are a number of formal and legal premises that support the maintenance of independence and institutional separation of individual entities (taken into account in the concept of establishing the Polish Development Fund - PAP)" - added the head of BGK.

He also noted that BGK is most present "in all areas indicated by Deputy Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, not only in terms of amounts, but also in terms of the assumptions of the strategy that the bank is implementing". "It seems to me that we are the closest to being the type of entity around which the implementation of this plan will take place," Kacprzyk noted.

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| Own analysis:  In this interview - given about ten days after Mateusz Morawiecki presented his Plan for Responsible Development and announced the creation of the PFR, the head of BGK, Dariusz Kacprzyk (2013-2016; at Bank Pekao SA in 2007-2009 and at BRE Bank – Commerzbank subsidiary led by Grendowicz, the PIR’s future PIR –in 2009-2013) claims that BGK will play a “leading” role in the establishment of the PFR. In reality, the interview seems to be an attempt to *defend* the institutional position of the BGK. Indeed, by April 2016, the PFR will be created via a conversion of PIR into PFR (not of the BGK into the PFR). The president of PFR SA, of the PFR Group’s will eventually be Paweł Borys (who took part in the preparation of the Morawiecki Plan before it was announced in February 2016 – anonymous source quoted in the main body of the paper). Less than two weeks after giving this interview, Dariusz Kacprzyk loses his job (BGK, 2016) and, by November 2016, is replaced by Beata Daszyńska-Muzyczka, a manager at BZ WBK – i.e. Mateusz Morawiecki’s former bank - between 1994 and 2016 (superbiz.se.pl, 2016). November 2016 is coincides with a time when Mateusz Morawiecki replaces Paweł Szałamacha as Minister of Finance [who has supervision over the BGK] in addition to already being Minister of Development. In a further illustration of the PFR’s stronger institutional position, Paweł Borys became the chairman of BGK sometime in 2016.  Crucially, Kacprzyk also says in the interview: “The Minister of Development is consulting this with us. BGK presents its proposals and comments”. To me, this suggests that the PFR concept has been developed primarily by Morawiecki “and his people” (see interviews with Szałamacha and anonymous source cited in the main body of the text) and that the BGK is mainly reacting to Morawiecki’s proposals – even if effectively the BGK’s head genuinely favors a greater coordination of existing development institutions. It should indeed be noted that Kacprzyk (who – as mentioned above – was a “comprador banker” since he worked at Bielecki’s bank Pekao in 2007-9 when Bielecki was Pekao’s CEO) was a member of the EFC’s Program Board in 2014 and 2015 (see A.7.2.25. in Appendix A.7.) – the years when the EFC made recommendations on an integration of developmental institutions into a holding company inspired by the KfW. |

## A.8.2.16. – Pracodawcy RP 2016/03

Pracodawcy RP (2016, March) Biała Księga „Stop biurokratyzmowi!” Rekomendacje z III Polskiego Kongresu Gospodarczego [White paper: “Stop to bureaucratism! Recommendations of the Third Polish Economic Congress]. <https://pracodawcyrp.pl/upload/files/2017/06/polski-kongres-gospodarczy-2016-biala-ksiega.pdf>

[N.B.: This is an excerpt of a white paper produced by Pracodawcy RP as part of an annual business conference it has been organizing *together with developmental institutions ARP and PARP*]

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**Innovation Potential**

*Main conclusions and recommendations*

• The state should foster the creation of a friendly environment for innovative undertakings. Financial resources should be directed to both science, i.e. basic research, and business implementation of the solutions created.

• At the same time, regulations should be loosened and the market should be allowed to operate - over-regulation is a serious barrier limiting entrepreneurship and innovation.

• Bridges should be created between ideas and their commercialization. An important role in this matter may be played by the coordination of activities of various institutions that support innovation.

• Funds for innovation within the current financial perspective of the European Union should be well used.

• The imperfections of patent law need to be corrected in order to shorten the waiting time for a patent.

*Diagnosis of the current state*

The main barriers to the development of innovation in Poland are the lack of funds for the so-called second round of financing (providing capital enabling companies to implement an innovative project), the lack of communication between science and business, as well as insufficient management of the innovative potential.

A significant barrier for many companies interested in supporting innovation is the lack of transparency in the area of competences of various institutions dealing with innovation. Poland undertakes many fragmented activities carried out by various entities, including PARP, ARP, NCN, NCBiR, National Focal Point [Krajowy Punkt Kontaktowy], as well as local governments and universities, which usually do not coordinate and monitor each other's activities.

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| Own analysis:  This white paper is published *after the Morawiecki Plan and the creation of the PFR were announced in February 2016*; this excerpt is the *only one* where the role and structure of developmental institutions are discussed in the white paper; the text clearly shows support for a greater coordination of their activities; yet the text does not make any concrete proposals for how those activities should be coordinated and does not mention the role of the BGK and PIR in this – despite the fact that relatively concrete proposals were already announced a month before. In my opinion, this demonstrates that this organization [and, potentially, ARP and PARP] has a broad preference for coordination, but has not been actively developing proposals to institutionalize such coordination and cannot be considered as directly engaging in a bottom-up co-option (through lobbying) of the government into creating an institution like the PFR Group |

## A.8.2.17. – BCC 2016/04

BCC (2016, April 11) Posiedzenie gospodarczego gabinetu cieni BCC [meeting of the shadow economic cabinet of BCC] <http://old.bcc.org.pl/uploads/media/2016.04.11_XVI_posiedzenie_GGC_BCC-_ocena_I_kwartalu_i_rekomendacje_01.pdf>

There is a lack of detailed projects and specific actions regarding the changes in the functioning of institutions supporting innovation and entrepreneurship, which have been under the supervision of the Minister of Development and other Ministers. For several months (including in the Plan for Responsible Development), the Minister of Development has been announcing changes in the functioning of institutions implementing the instruments to support entrepreneurship and innovation policy. On the basis of the existing development support institutions (including Korporacja Ubezpieczeń Kredytów Eksportowych SA, Polish Information and Foreign Investments Agency, Agencja Rozwoju Przemysłu SA, Polskie Inwestycje Rozwojowe SA, Polish Agency for Enterprise Development), the plan is to create an integrated structure of development institutions as part of the Polski Fundusz Rozwoju SA Group supervised by the Minister of Development, hereinafter referred to as: "PFR". The scope and method of inclusion of Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego in the integrated structures of PFR will be specified in a detailed concept prepared by the Minister of Development with the participation of the Minister of Finance. However, the lack of guidelines as to the way of further operation of several very important institutions, managing significant funds, may result in a reduction of motivation in the current activity, and thus a reduction in quality. In light of the enormous challenges (the end of the old perspective and the acceleration of the new one), such a disorder institutional and waiting for changes may cause problems with the implementation of short-term and long-term tasks.

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| Own analysis:  This excerpt shows that BCC is concerned about the lack of details regarding the PFR Group. It does not criticize the concept, so this rather shows latent support for it, but the fact it awaits details shows the organization is not privy to what is happening at the level of the Ministry of Development. Hence the organization is certainly not a prime mover or driving force here. |

## A.8.2.18. – EFC recommendation on PFR 2016/06

European Financial Congress (2016, June, 13-5) Recommendation nr 1 <https://www.efcongress.com/rekomendacje/rekomendacje-2016/>

**The Polish Development Fund and responsible economic development**

The Polish Development Fund (PFR) should support mechanisms for financing economic development that are, as a rule, neutral from the point of view of public debt and should perform a coordinating function in the area of state intervention. Therefore, it should constitute an important instrument stabilizing public finances and supporting the long-term financing of economic development.

An important goal of the Polish Development Fund (PFR) should be to increase the investment attractiveness of strategic development projects and to reduce the risk of private capital. When designing the strategy and structure of the PFR, one should use the experience of the main development institutions in the European Union.

The following aspects are particularly important:

1. The PFR should be a company that is not subject to banking supervision.

2. Ultimately, various types of activities should be carried out by separate entities within the holding structure. The definition of business models implemented by PFR in individual business segments should result from the goals set out in the Plan for Responsible Development and the conditions of the domestic financial system. The integration of PFR institutions should lead to increased efficiency by eliminating duplicate functions and clearly defining competence centers.

3. The PFR should carry out activities that are complementary to private institutions. It should be emphasized that the activities of a state-owned bank in its present shape must not distort competition on financial markets, and therefore should be additive to the commercial market offer. A good example of such activity was the de minimis guarantee program offered by BGK.

4. The PFR should catalyze the inflow of long-term financing and investments from international markets to the Polish economy and support foreign expansion and innovation of Polish entrepreneurs.

5. The activity of the PFR should be counter-cyclical, i.e. it should mitigate the amplitude of fluctuations in the economic cycle.

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| Own analysis:  This recommendation is issued by the European Financial Congress in 2016 already *after* Mateusz Morawiecki announced the creation of the PFR in February 2016 and, although it is an expression of the preferences of the EFC on the design of the PFR, it cannot be assumed to have much influence on it. One interesting aspect with this recommendation is that it was preceded by a *draft* recommendation whose first sentence (“The participants of the Congress welcomed the consolidation by the government of institutions responsible for supporting development in one body. Financial circles had formulated this demand in the past. This concept was included in the plan of Deputy Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki.”) was eventually suppressed. That draft recommendation can be seen in [A.8.2.20](#_A.8.2.20._–_EFC) . The program of the 2016 EFC also included a plenary debate on the PFR chaired by Zbigniew Jagiełło (CEO of PKO BP) with Paweł Borys (the head of the PFR and former PKO BP top manager in charge of the BZ WBK takeover bid) and representatives of various European development banks as participants (see [A.8.2.19](#_A.8.2.19._–_EFC)) |

## A.8.2.19. – EFC debate on PFR 2016/06

PKO BP (2016, June, 14) PFR będzie wpierać inwestycje wzmacniające rozwój gospodarczy kraju [The PFR will support investments strengthening economic development in the country]

<https://bankomania.pkobp.pl/bankofinanse/trendy/pfr-bedzie-wpierac-inwestycje-wzmacniajace-rozwoj-gospodarczy-kraju/>

The Polish Development Fund is to contribute to ensuring that investments in the economy are carried out efficiently, effectively strengthening GDP growth - this is the key task of the PFR defined during the plenary debate on the role of development institutions during the 6th European Financial Congress in Sopot. PKO Bank Polski was its host and CEO Zbigniew Jagiełło [a stable member of the EFC’s Program Board – see A.7.2.21 in Appendix A.7. on PIR] moderated the panelists' discussion.

According to the Plan for Responsible Development, the Polish Development Fund is to be one of the key instruments for building capital for development purposes. Currently, on the basis of Polskie Inwestycje Rozwojowe (PIR), the construction of a capital group has begun to consolidate the main institutions supporting economic development in Poland under the leadership of Paweł Borys, until recently the head of Strategy and Analyzes at PKO Bank Polski. The overriding goal of this project is to integrate the activities carried out so far by PIR, the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development (PARP), the Industrial Development Agency (ARP), the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency (PAIiIZ), the Export Credit Insurance Corporation (KUKE) and Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), so as to fully use their potential and release synergies resulting from team work.

The discussion during this year's EKF was an excellent opportunity to discuss the target shape of the group of development institutions to be coordinated by PFR and to directly confront Polish ideas in this area with the experiences of representatives of development institutions from Germany, France and Spain.

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), the German state-owned development bank, founded in 1948 as part of the Marshall Plan, with assets in excess of € 500 billion at the end of 2015, is the third largest bank in Germany. - We have built an integrated operating model. You have to be fast, flexible and know what the market needs and when. Until recently, we supported liquidity, now our participation in risk-sharing is more needed - said Lutz-Christian Funke, vice president of KfW.

In turn, the Spanish Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO) was established in the early 1970s, and since 1991 it has been operating as a state-owned investment bank. The purpose of the ICO is to maintain and support activities that foster economic growth. The Institute is a pioneer in financing those sectors where private funding is insufficiently developed. - We act counter-cyclically. When commercial banks cut funding for the economy, we strengthen it. This is especially important for the small and medium-sized enterprise sector. We are currently focusing on supporting the internationalization of Spanish companies, said Fernando Navarrete, CFO of the Instituto de Crédito Oficial.

The oldest of the development institutions represented in the Sopot debate was the French Caisse des Dépôts, operating for 200 years. It was originally established to secure funds and retirement accounts for the civil service. Currently, its goal is to support the economic development of France, both nationally and locally. The CDC Group is a long-term investor involved, inter alia, in financing social housing, enterprise development, energy, tourism and ecology. Its balance sheet total at the end of 2015 was EUR 156 billion. "We've learned that we can't do everything the government wants us to do. This is why we've survived for 200 years," said Laurent Zylberberg, vice president of Caisse des Dépôts.

According to the head of PFR, there is no one universal model for the operation of development institutions. - Just as economies change, so do development banks. In the coming years, there will be no problem with money for development, because we have EU funds at our disposal. Their effective absorption will be a challenge, said Paweł Borys, summing up the debate. He added that one of the priorities of the PFR in this context will be to support the absorption of EU funds and to support and create good investment projects.

Izabela Świderek-Kowalczyk  
Expert at PKO Bank Polski

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| Own analysis:  While this document is of little value for understanding the political process that has led to the creation of the PFR, it provides a good illustration of how the European Financial Congress has been able to invite various experts (here, representatives of foreign development institutions KfW, ICO and CDC) in order to learn from them and, potentially, to co-opt them into helping the EFC design new institutions and defend them politically. |

## A.8.2.20. – EFC draft recommendation on PFR 2016/06

Bień, K. (2016, June, 19) Bez kapitału nie będzie rozwoju [There will be no development without capital]. *Obserwatory Finansowy*.

<https://www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl/tematyka/rynki-finansowe/bankowosc/bez-kapitalu-nie-bedzie-rozwoju/>

Finding new opportunities for long-term savings and financing development, stimulating innovation and correcting the bank tax are three key recommendation out of fifteen recommendations adopted by the European Financial Congress in Sopot. Cybersecurity issues were also of great interest.

**The participants of the Congress welcomed the consolidation by the government of institutions responsible for supporting development in one body. Financial circles had formulated this demand in the past. This concept was included in the plan of Deputy Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki.** [highlighted in bold by myself] The emerging Polish Development Fund should support mechanisms of financing economic development, that are, in principle, neutral from the point of view of public debt and should perform a coordinating function in the area of state intervention. Therefore, it should constitute an important instrument stabilizing public finances and supporting long-term financing of economic development - we read in the adopted recommendation.

- The new structure should not, however, infringe competition. A state-owned bank or any institution that relies on public money or raises money from the financial market because it has state guarantees should not infringe competition on financial markets - commented prof. Leszek Pawłowicz, director of the Gdańsk Banking Academy and organizer of the annual Sopot meeting - on the recommendation. (…)

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| Own analysis:  The draft of the EFC’s 2016 recommendation on the PFR included this first sentence [highlighted in bold] that was subsequently deleted from the final recommendation ([A.8.2.18](#_A.8.2.18._–_EFC).). The sentence suggests that the European Financial Congress feels that the PFR fulfills its recommendations from years. The source is certainly a reliable one: The article is published in Obserwator Finansowy – a website run by the National Bank of Poland. The author of the article [Krzysztof Bień] is a member of the Department of Economic Analysis at the National Bank of Poland. It is unclear why this first sentence was subsequently deleted from the final recommendation. Perhaps it would have drawn too much attention to Mateusz Morawiecki’s proximity with the European Financial Congress and Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (linked with the Civic Platform) at a time when Mateusz Morawiecki surprisingly became Minister of Development and deputy Prime Minister in a PiS-led government. In an interview with the author, a person very close to the matter - cited in the main body of the paper - says that the EFC was not directly involved in drafting the Morawiecki Plan and in designing the PFR though they conceded that it may have acted as an “inspiration”. |

## A.8.2.21. – Morawiecki speech at EFC 2016/06

Europejski Kongres Finansowy (2016, July 26). Mateusz Morawiecki – VI Europejski Kongres Finansowy. *YouTube*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RbK7s8eOd5U&t=170s>

[N.B. This is a transcript of the first three minutes of a keynote – in fact, opening - speech given by Mateusz Morawiecki – invited as Minister of Development – on the topic of “what future for Poland in Europe” at the 2016 EFC. The speech was made on June 13]

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very much for inviting me to this congress. I have attended all previous editions, so I am glad that I can keep this tradition here. On a day like this, it is also impossible not to refer to football analogies, because, as it turned out, we can also win at the Euro [... Euro 2016 coincided with the EFC 2016]. What future for Poland in Europe? I think that the future is more or less like our team at the Euro. We can win with the best. We showed on the pitch that we can also win with Germany [… though it was a tie: 0:0..]. However, we really have to play as a team. We have to play at least to the same extent as a team as yesterday. We need to understand companies, public administration and science above all as a team. I think that playing together as a team is what characterizes the most mature countries. (...)"Deutschland AG" is how, in a nutshell, this attitude is called in Germany. They have been doing this for 50 years, but they do not stick with it too much. What characterizes this is a very close intertwining of individual elements of business, financial and public administration architecture, export promotion and a very strong cooperation with science and with what creates innovation.

What future for Poland in Europe? Here, I would like, first of all, to bow to you, to all the participants, to the founders of the European Financial Congress because the European Financial Congress has always been apolitical and technocratic in a very positive sense of the word. It has worked out individual solutions and developed recommendations. I reached out to these recommendations from recent years. There were 44 of them. Among them there was such a recommendation, for example from last year, to develop a coherent strategy in the field of industrial policy and to avoid short-termism. Another one was to ensure that there is cooperation between research institutes and the industry. That was the recommendation. Well, it reminds me something very much of something ... I do not know about you ... But I will definitely try to use the best achievements of this type of recommendation. (…)

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| Own analysis:  In these first minutes of this EFC 2016 opening speech, Mateusz Morawiecki pays respect to the founders of the European Financial Congress (of which he was an active participant since the Congress’s foundation in 2011 since he was a stable member of the EFC’s Program Board between 2011 and 2015 – i.e. until he resigned from BZ WBK and became Minister of Development. By talking about football teams and Deutschland AG, Mateusz Morawiecki signals his readiness to continue cooperating with the business community despite being in government (and perhaps even hints at a willingness to act as a “team” despite being in a government led by a party (PiS) that has extremely tense relations with the opposition (PO and its leader Tusk whom Jarosław Kaczyński and many PiS activists consider as – at the very least, morally – responsible for the 2010 Smolensk airplane crash where President Lech Kaczyński died together with a hundred of other Poles; these tensions make Morawiecki’s speech particularly surprising). Morawiecki directly mentions recommendation nr 11 (active industrial policy) issued by the EFC in 2015. The content of that recommendation bears surprising resemblance with the Morawiecki plan and the PFR Group concept. Morawiecki hints (“Well, it reminds me something very much of something ... I do not know about you ...”) at the fact that, at the very least, he was inspired by that recommendation. In an interview with the author, a person close to the matter says: “Inspiration: yes; Strategy [or Morawiecki Plan]: no”. |

# A.8.3. Additional references

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